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ARGUM ENT 
I. I H 1 P - L J i v k i A l l u i t l h i i / v i i k h L U k l . ) i M i U ' i u k l i L h ' B Y 
APPhl . i : s i AND A P P A R E N T L Y A D O P T E D BY l l l h 1 K 1 A L C 0 U R 1 K 
AS N u i REQUIRING A " F I R S T TO R E C O R D " S U B S E Q U E N T 
P U R C H A S E R TO ESTABLISH A CHAIN OF TITLE. IS L E G A L L Y 
U N S O U N D . UNJUST, A N D B A D PUBLIC POLICY 
Appellees [collectively, "Metro West"] urges this court to embrace a nigim lev ._.:. 
inri Mteral appi.v.n,* * . .; *. Kecoruni- * •' • • •> • 
* *
 ,i
 ^ nl land conveyances, and is thus contrary to sound public 
policy. It is undisputed that there was absolute!} no record title evidence supporting flic 
Tingeys' representations to Metro West that they were the lawful owners ol Parcel < i I 'he 
ink i'Ccorus IILKK . V=. I ll i, n n a <. nu | o u futtji ml i on\o\nniv ol am kind to 
;
' * *< - - • • Tineeys * pi lrported quitclaim deed conveyance to Metro was a classic 
"wild deed," (t.c., "a deed from a person not in (he chain of title, and therefore without any 
force or effect as far as conveying any intere*1 A. .* ^ / I n I •->• 
' v n ui title to Parcel G. 
*"ner, there was absolutely no other evidence before the trial court supporting the Tingeys* 
claim of title (-ucli as evidence of a claim by adverse possession). In this casL. ivk u * \\ est 
has been strangely silent as to the legal hnsn loi il» ;• mini , i Lini ml lilli 
I- now r, ilmi Mriiif WVsl CIIMOIISIN chose to accept the Tingeys's uncorroborated statements 
that "the Tingey family had owned Parcel (i since the turn of the century" (Appellee^ Brief 
p. 3, %l\ w ithoui any meaningful verification or ii lvestigation. * ci. iiii ougn IL, HK ^i.^iisiic 
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interpretation of the Act, Metro West would have this court affirm the trial court's award of 
title to the property merely because it - as a subsequent purchaser - happened to record its 
deed in Utah county prior to recordation by Salt Lake County ["the County"]. 
This issue appears to be one of first impression before Utah appellate courts. While 
it is true that the Act does not expressly require that a good faith subsequent purchaser's 
grantor must have "good chain of title," other jurisdictions have implied such a requirement 
as a condition precedent to protection under the Act. For example, in Sonderman v. 
Remington Const. Co., Inc., 127 NJ. 96, 115, 603 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1992) the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, principally on equitable grounds, rejected the claim of Sonderman, a 
subsequent good faith purchaser under the New Jersey recording act, because Sonderman's 
grantor had no legal title to convey. There, property of Remington Construction Co. 
[Remington] was purportedly sold to Sonderman in a county tax lien foreclosure sale. 
Remington had successfully moved to vacate the tax judgment before the county delivered 
its deed to Sonderman, based upon constitutionally defective notice in the lien foreclosure 
proceeding. Therefore, the court reasoned, since the county's judgment was never valid, the 
county had never acquired title to Remington's property. Hence, when the county's deed was 
subsequently received and recorded by Sonderman, it conveyed no actual interest. Id., 603 
A.2d at 4. Still, Sonderman had paid value for the property and was without notice that the 
county's tax judgment was void because Remington had failed to file its tax judgment 
vacation order with the county recorder. Thus, Sonderman relied upon New Jersey's 
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rcTofdni'L? act, which read in pertinent part: , 
"Every deed or instrument .. shall until duh recorded or lodged for record in 
the office of the count} recording officer in winch the affected real estate or 
other proper!} is situate, be void and of no effect against *** all subsequent all 
subsequent bona fide purchasers *** ---hosv deed sh J ; % - - '^  •*" r*r^ d"ly 
recorder 
.ill iifijoliiu''1 N 1 S A § 46:22-1 (*** omissions in original). The New Jersey court 
stated "... that '[gjenerally speaking, and absent any unusual equity, a court should decide 
a question of title such as this in the way that vwii DCSI ^uppi : ; >f 
.... . . i ( l i i i t u i v s t c m ' . " ' "fi"! It., . i s ••• oui me court 
concluded, u[o]n these facts, wc find that Remingiui: ^i^aid ha\e recorded UR [\u\ 
judgment | \aeanon order in the county deed book, but the balance of equities tips in favor 
of finding tha< a is cMittm M renin, a ^ •*<• 
t uii t i tn\i ia\ i t) i l i (1 1111*.. • ••»*. • -...* i w statute^ do not generally cure defects 
i n tfiic: 7^ recorded deed, for example, may be a forger-}, procured by fraud in the execution, 
executed by a minor, or never delivered. Any one of these deicets will make the deed v oid, 
and llit latl ilut it is lecordcd iiiiii MM HIM enhanu • ml i ilmiih \iuottui\ kouu I \ . 
C/., siniiiai lui . tuu^ v>i uui i s iccoruiiiL: ad. kuc;i document not recorded as 
pu>\ided in this title is \ oi;l against anv subsequent purchaser of the same real property, 
or any portion of it. if 
v . . , .*ie subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith 
and lot a \ aluable consideration; and 
/T
^ ic subsequent purchaser's document
 t , ,UM duly recorded. 
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Cunningham, William B. Stoebuck, & Dale A. Whitman, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, §11.9 at 
782 (1984). Accord, Nobel v. Kahn, 240 P.2d 757,759 (Okla. 1952) ("The doctrine of bona 
fide purchaser without notice does not apply where there is a total absence of title in the 
vendor.") 
The Sonderman scenario is very analogous to the instant case. Like Remington, Salt 
Lake County failed to record its 1878 warranty deed from William Turner in Utah County 
(though it did record the deed in Salt Lake County under an apparent misapprehension 
regarding the true location of the county boundary line against which Parcel G lies). So, 
while Metro West was first to record in Utah County, the equitable considerations weighed 
by the New Jersey court also tip in favor of Salt Lake County as the lawful title owner. The 
trial court never required Metro West to show facts supporting its grantor's claim of title, 
despite the undisputed fact that Salt Lake County had, in 1878, purchased a warranty deed 
from the original government land patentee. The "first in time" scheme of Utah's race-notice 
recording act should not be applied with such mindless, rigid mechanism as to vest title 
inequitably in a subsequent purchaser who may assert a purported interest based only upon 
a worthless deed from a rogue or sham grantor outside the chain of title. The recording act 
should not be so mechanically applied as to effectively sanction misrepresentation, fraud or 
theft. 
The inequitable outcome of Metro West's interpretation of the Act is illustrated as 
follows: 
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• A orally claims to own Blackacre, but is in fact only a tenant of the true owner, 
X, who never recorded his warranty deed (or inadvertently recorded it in the 
wrong county). 
• The deed records in me relevant couniv snow \V- , :-, I-K .. . t ; , i9 
a fact which is knowi t.1 B \n<\ ( . 
• •< '.s .'irnp:!'. teed. 
• The next day, A conveys to C by quiiciaun dceii. 
• C records his quitclaim deed; B subsequently records his warranty deed. 
Result: I Ji ider the reasoning oi iVlclm Wesl .null llio liiiill i ntiil i has a i liiim Il hili 
Mipcin In Ih ml I B h\ atisi: ( (rerun lu I h • \ cvance first. More significantly, in a quiet 
title action between X and either B or C, X - the lawful owner will lose his land to a party 
that knew A had no record chain of title. 
*'
 5
 > die Count) doco nuL oinipl) lca\e die *"iimuv.cnt"" 
subsequent pu:chaser holding the ban. The subsequent purchaser's remedy (assuming he 
truly purchased for value, in good iunn. .iiui without notice), then, wouiu 
tille b) aiiloiiiiilii opeMlmii nil hi1,1! Iml I in'on-r diiniii^es againsl Ins grantor. In the 
alternative, the purchaser could present evidence to the court establishing the \ aiidii\ * This 
grantor's title (which Metro West has never even attempted, and was never requncd. ;o do 
2Of course, whenever a purchaser pays for a quit -..ah «'ia i IM 
ascertaining the sound condition of the grantor's ti'1 ; *.
 w iJwiicv ol title 
; - - w ^ :v Metr- u -^ J;<* ^ tKk ^,^.. h. L ^s in riskv business. 
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in this case). Because there are lingering fact issues relating to the authenticity and 
soundness of the title purportedly conveyed to Metro West by the Tingeys, summary 
judgment was improper and these issues should be remanded for trial. 
II. UNDERPENDER V. BIRD. METRO WEST CANNOT BE "GOOD FAITH" 
PURCHASERS BECAUSE IT KNEW ITS GRANTORS. THE TINGEYS. 
HAD NO DOCUMENTARY CLAIM OF TITLE TO PARCEL G. 
Irrespective of whether the Act requires proof of "good chain of title" by one 
claiming its protection, it is clear that the Act does expressly require that a subsequent 
purchaser take in "good faith." The County maintains that on the issue of Metro West's 
"good faith" as a subsequent purchaser of Parcel G, this court's decision in Pender v. Bird, 
224 P. 2d 1057 (Utah 1950) controls. There, Pender's grantor, Hansen, advised Pender that 
he did not own the subject property. Pender nonetheless accepted a quitclaim deed from 
Hansen, paying $25. Pender then recorded the quitclaim deed before Bird recorded his tax 
deed, arguing in the ensuing quiet title action that he was protected as a subsequent good 
faith purchaser for value. The Utah Supreme Court, affirming the judgment below quieting 
title in Bird, held: 
" One who procures a quitclaim deed for a nominal sum after being advised 
that the grantor does not own the property, can neither assert in good faith that 
he purchaser the property without notice of any infirmity in the title, nor that 
he was a purchaser for value .... It is only when a purchaser parts with money 
constituting the purchaser price in reliance on the title of his grantor, without 
notice of any infirmity in his grantor Js title, that the purchaser acts bona 
fides." 
Id., 224 P.2d at 1059 (emphasis added). Accord, Oakland Hills Dev. Corp, v. Lueders 
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Drainage Disi " \1 N \V M *SX H}1 (Mich. 4pp. 199^ n under recording act, "[a] good 
faith purchaser is one who purchasers without notice of a defect in the vendor's title"). 
Here. M ^T •' -Iocs not dispute that it was fully aware thai mc 1 UIL:C>S held no 
documented than, *.; t.;,v .;* m, \ »dt has made no effoil in Ih'h litigation lo LStifHrJ. the 
integrity • of tt le I ingej s" ' titl s I\ let! c "W est merel> asserts that it "relied" on the Tingeys' 
uncorroborated oral representations. Such reliance, in the conspicuous absence of record 
title, in addition to being commercially foolhardv. r- lcgan\ inadequate to estan.,ai a 
purchaser's "gooa ia;;.. v 
%\ -*st knew of the infirmity in the record title it purportedly took 
ifu;^ iiiw Tingeys and was there lore not a "good faith" purchaser for purposes of the Act. 
III. IN THE ALTERN li. MhlKU v\i> i£._n/ 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF j ^ 1 K ;1MJ AC1 
SINCE THERE WERE GENUIN1 , ._,. ..,„,. ,. .CT AS TO 
ITS STATUS AS A "GOOD FA1TI1 R 
Recording systems were createu t_» ptoudc a consistem i : reliable M>UI\C of 
reference and \ alidation to which purchasers - acting in ^H,U Jaitf; ^ . W , J wxamiiK ana 
thereby assure themselves illllii.il IIIIn'11 iiiilci Ml i iilltll I rcrof i i i /ed ' See *< \ if iitlin v. 
i his. db e\piaincu u> tin. : >:t f.\tK^.< • >/ J^ropcrtx. does ,iOi uiwa\^ mean 
that the recording act's memorialized statement of ownership is fail proof Restatement 
(Second) of Property § 20.4 (1986). There may be instances where, after giving valid 
consideration in exchange for the grantor s phxsical RhnuuHinient of ownership the 
grantee fails to record his interest -*.• *o\\c\er. because the recording act constitutes an 
authoritative statement of ownership, for legal purposes the grantor remains the record 
legal - although perhaps not physical owner ol the property until the grantee recor.! 
interest. Id.. See also. Alcxande? " ' \ /•' 'Yr ! ' V ~^P ( Viz. 195 ^  Wh;i-.. 
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Commercial State Bank of Two, 487 N.W.2d 242, 247 (1992) ("[T]he purpose of the 
recording act is to protect those who purchase real estate in reliance upon the record."); 
Kovacevic v. City of Chicago, 365 N.E.2d 104, 106 (111. App. Ct. 1977) ("[T]he purpose of 
any recording act is to give a person the opportunity of ascertaining the status of title to legal 
property."); md Skill v. Careage Corp., 353 N.W.2d416, 418 (la. 1984) ("[T]he purpose of 
the recording act is 'to notify subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers of the rights [the 
recorded] instruments are intended to secure."). 
The recording act is only meant to protect a bona fide purchaser. Pender v. Bird, 
supra, 224 P.2d at 1069 (1950); see also, Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1987). But in this case, there are numerous substantial fact questions posed with 
respect to Metro West's good faith in its purchase of Parcel G. Metro West was, by a variety 
of factors, placed on "inquiry notice" of potential defects in the Tingey deed. In its 
opposition brief, Metro West totally misses the point of the County's argument here. Metro 
West argues at length that there was nothing to put it on inquiry notice fo the County's 
competing claim of title (Appellees' Brief, at 19-24). That is not the issue4. Rather, the issue 
recording act may maintain as good an assertion of a property interest that was once 
valid but later, because of a secret or unrecorded transfer, no longer valid, it is impossible 
for the recording statute to validate or cure an assertion of title that was never valid. (See 
note 2). 
4Although, Metro West's argument that there were "no activities or documents 
indicating that the County had any purported interest in Parcel G" (Appellees' Brief, p. 
24) is not exactly correct. The County's evidence submitted in opposition to Metro 
West's motion for summary judgment clearly demonstrated that a reasonably thorough 
professional title search would have revealed the County's competing claim of interest. 
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is "Vi i: lether Metro West knew, or through reasonably diligent inquiry should have known, of 
defects in the Tingeys' title. It seems ludicrous for one to assert "good faith" as a subsequent 
purchaser when one has done virtually nothing to ascertain and ensure the soununcv*.. . ins 
grantors' title. 
j r;; •'- of mis case there are questions of fact that preclude summary 
judgment and require that a finder of fact determine the reasonableness of the Appellee's 
action a^ purchaser, and <r>e. .uv.ii- ^iKiiicr Metro West was piaceao . ^.. »f 
, • •_ . . • i •• a w n 
of interest. Diversified Equities v. American Savings and Loan Ass 'n, 739 l\2<i 1 i J . \ i 139 
(1 Jtah 1987) (holding, "whether a party should K charged with inquiry notice turns on a 
question o;
 Ms, , ifc statements maae h ...... . . ... i -i it 
- •* - • •
 J
 '• i.-u - - •* • lc?;i! de^'r^ntioiibhouiu 
reasonably have placed a purchaser on notice that further inquiry regarding the integrity of 
the title was called for A purchaser should not, as happened here, be permitted to hide 
••^.i..iu ihe recording statute allui IIJ\ IIIIJ ilelihenilclv lurii "ill ;i blind r\r In nh\ inn*, iinln i.i 
• i ,,,,
 (,, n mipctilvI claims. Pender v. Bird, 224 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Utah 1950) ("the 
i i;L ^oaiii) h aliidavii of title examiner i ammert Veenstra stated thai his rex icvx of BLM 
records disclosed the U.S. government patent to \\ ilham Turner from whom Nail J ^ c 
. :.nty took it warranty deed : eel G, and led to Turner's deed to Sail Lake Count}. 
(See Appel lants Brief p. I"7. and R.I 98. €;9» I huv Veenstra \s search led to discoxvrx of 
the County's interest, even though not recorded in Utah County. It is reasonable to 
presume that through reasonable inquiry, Metro West also coi ild have discovered the 
ronntY's inter- •-< 
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[recording] statute was not enacted to protect one whose ignorance of the title is deliberate 
and intentional"). 
As discussed in the County's opening brief, Metro West failed to take any steps, 
recognized as standard precautionary measures in modem real estate transactions, to 
determine the quality of the Tingeys' claim of title. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-19. For 
instance, Metro West did not require its grantor to warrant their conveyance (instead 
accepting a quitclaim deed), did not cause a professional title search to be performed, did not 
obtain title insurance, and did not seek legal counsel in purchasing Parcel G. Id.. These are 
all standard measures which real estate purchasers routinely take to secure an assurance of 
sound title. Instead, Metro West's principal, Paul Richards, relied solely on a scant review 
of Utah County records with his partner (they allegedly "checked with the county"(Depo. 
Paul Richards [R. 216-217], 11. 21 -5)). That's it. "Checking with the county" constitutes 
the sum total of Metro West's efforts to verify the Tingeys' claims, and to secure its own 
title. There is no record evidence in this case that any sort of competent, professional, 
industry-standard title examination was conducted. Metro West now asserts that its cursory, 
non-professional title review found "no conflicts with the Tingeys' representations" 
(Appellees' Brief, p. 22, fn. 3). This statement is just remarkable. The undisputed fact is that 
Utah County's records failed in any way to confirm the Tingeys' representations and, in fact, 
raised several "red flags" about those representations. A meaningful title examination would 
have revealed that (a) the Tingeys had no claim to Parcel G by a prior recorded conveyance 
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and thu :../h <rw ic uuc, (b) the Utah County recorder had visibly flagged the Parcel 
G plat as having "title issues/' and (c) constructive notice of the claim of title by Salt Lake 
County existed in property records outside Utah i <»un;\ \: i u^ Ui \\*. .; .enstra, 
of title t :) si ippor t the 1 ingeys' representations. • ; 
In not just one, but many, ways, Metro West's alleged purchase of Parcel G doesn't 
pass the "smell test." As an experienced commercial ianu^>nci. \i^\\< \ \ i ^ .... ,ar 
\lnull oil !lit noi i Msin iHinlciill u ill r'Jtili iH'ii* lii • " • •- ? •- * • * *f - *s 
prospective title raise - at a minimum - genuine issues of material fact as to whether it acted 
in "good faith" and "without notice." All of these fact issues were duly presented by the 
County to the tna! cum; ,\<M n^ iaiiLvin-^uiw >:»aj.j w* .LIII MIL -.W I^ MIL -,:H;,.. v , : .v iv ely 
,v!i* j - s" •* J' ''-tiaw. Iliib ruling was 
fundamentally erroneous and, accordingly, the case should be remanded for trial on the fact 
issues surrounding Metro West's status as a "good faith" subsequent purchaser, and whether 
the surrounding taet:> anu vueumstances PULL ; ^ 
ivULL 4 - > J l U h D ; *-.': l i l n n n u v . ( )DL ()1 JUD1CL U.. 
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE THE COUNTY'S 
ASSERTION OF DISPUTED FACTS. 
The County maintains that numerous genuine issues oi maienai iaa. were presented 
5See, t\^.. the Affidavit of I .ammert V eenstra [R 199-200]; Plaintiff 's Mei no in 
Opposition »*• ! Vfendants9 I\ lotion for Si immary Ji idgment, pp 9 17 [R 173 181]. 
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to the trial court which ought to have precluded summary judgment. Metro West argues that 
various questions of material fact raised by the County below in the main text6 of its 
memorandum in opposition to Metro West's motion for summary judgment ["Plf s Opp. 
Memo."] were not properly "disputed" by the County, and should thus be "deemed 
admitted." In so arguing, Appellees urge a highly technical and harsh application of Rule 
4-501 (2) (B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, which provides: 
Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends 
a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered 
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the recorded upon 
which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered 
sentence of sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts 
set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate 
reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
Appellees cite this rule for the proposition that issues as to material facts that were 
disputed by the County in the main text of its Opposition Memorandum, but were not 
separately enumerated in a preliminary statement of disputed facts, are waived. Appellees' 
Brief at 3, 18, 27. Utah courts have held that this type of a hyper-technical application of 
similar notice rules would subordinate substance to form, and amount to an abuse of justice. 
See, e.g., Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 993 P.2d 207 (Utah 2000). In Vigos, the 
6For instance, the very first subject heading under the "Argument" section of the 
County's Opposition Memorandum was "DISPUTED MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR METRO WEST." [R. 169]. 
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court considered a notice rule that required that workers compensation claimants for 
permanent total disability benefits to file a specific form within six years from the date of 
injury. Although Vigos filed a two requests within the statutory time limit, he did not file the 
correct form until nine months after time had expired. The Utah Supreme Court, finding that 
Vigos had provided sufficient notice, held: 
Notwithstanding the fact that the [worker's compensation] statutes require 
either the filing of a claim for compensation or the filing of a written notice of 
the accident in order to invade the jurisdiction of the Commission, this Court 
has long recognized that a claim for compensation need not bear any particular 
formality. In fact, 'great liberality as to form and substance of an application 
for compensation is to be indulged.' However informal the claim may be, it 
need only give 'notice to the parties and to the commission of the material 
facts on which the right asserted is to depend and against whom claim is 
made.' 
Id. at 210. See also, Gatrell v. Salt Lake County, 149 P.2d 827, 830 (Utah 1944) (Larson, J. 
dissenting) (applying a pleading rule on a motion for judgment on the pleadings explained, 
"I can imagine no more serious abuse of justice than the toleration of a kind of technical, 
stray practice that sacrifices substance to form."). 
In its opposition memorandum filed in response to Appellees' motion for summary 
judgment, the County extensively disputed Appellees' factual contentions supporting their 
claims of being a good faith purchaser without notice, and of being a successful adverse 
possessor of Parcel G. (R. 165-247) Appellees now would have this court wholly disregard 
these disputed facts merely because they were presented to the trial court in the principal text 
of the County's Opposition Memorandum, rather than in a preliminary statement. 
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The purpose of Rule 4-501 (2) (B) is to provide an orderly means whereby the 
opposing party and the court may be informed of the material facts in dispute, not to sacrifice 
substantial justice at the alter of formality. See, Scottv. Majors, 1999 UT App 139,980 P.2d 
214,217 (Utah 1999) ("The purpose of the Code of Judicial Administration is to bring order 
to the manner in which the courts operate. They are (sic) not intended to, nor do they, create 
or modify substantive rights of litigants, nor do they decrease the inherent power of the court 
to control matters pending before it.") It is undisputed that the County presented the material 
facts that were in dispute in a clear and concise manner. The purpose of the rule was 
therefore fulfilled. It would run contrary to fundamental notions of fairness and substantial 
justice to hold that the material facts clearly disputed in the text of the County's brief, but 
merely omitted from an introductory, were conclusively "deemed admitted." 
V. METRO WEST IS NOT THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF PARCEL G UNDER 
UTAH'S ADVERSE POSSESSION LAW 
Metro West argues that even if the trial court erred in awarding title to it under the 
recording act, it nonetheless holds title by adverse possession. While the trial court did not 
address Metro West's adverse possession claim, Metro West now asks this court to do so, 
arguing that an appellate court may affirm on any proper ground, even though the trial court 
relied on some other ground (Appellees' Brief at 25). While this is correct, the "affirm on 
any ground" doctrine applies only where there are facts sufficient to support the alternative 
ground established in the record. See, e.g., Renn v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 904 P2d 677, 685 
(Utah 1995); Limb v. Federated Milk Producers'Ass 'n, 461 p.2d 290,293 n. 2 (1969). But 
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such is not the case here. As shown below, Metro West has failed to establish facts sufficient 
to satisfy the elements of an adverse possession claim as a matter of law, and leaves for 
factual determination the question of whether the property was "dedicated [by the County] 
to a public use" thereby barring, at the threshold, any claim for adverse possession. Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-13. 
(A) Metro West Has not Shown Facts in the Record 
Establishing the Statutory Elements of Adverse 
Possession 
Metro West has not established by undisputed facts that it meets the statutory 
requirements of adverse possession. Because Metro West cannot hold legal title to Parcel 
G through the recording act, a presumption exists under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7 that the 
County holds legal title.7 There remain numerous issues of fact surrounding Metro West's 
claim of adverse possession which should be remanded for trial. The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that a strict burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he has met the 
7
 The Utah Code establishes the presumptions that exist in an adverse possession 
claim. It states: 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession 
thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be 
presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required 
by law; and the occupation of the property by any other person 
shall be deemed to have been under and in subordination to the 
legal title, unless it appears that the property has been held and 
possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the 
commencement of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7 (1996)(emphasis added). 
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requirements of adverse possession. See English v. Openshaw, 78 P. 476 (Utah 1904); Fares 
v. Urban, 151 P. 57 (Utah 1915); Spring Creek Irrigation Co. v. Zollinger, 197 P. 737 (Utah 
1921). The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that, "because of the gravity of adverse 
possession claims— wresting title from otherwise rightful owners—claimants must strictly 
comply with all requirements." Martin v. Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(emphasis added). 
Metro West's reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-88 as its basis for an adverse 
possession claim does not automatically confer ownership upon it. In order to obtain title by 
adverse possession under a written document, Metro West must meet at least one of the 
requirements for such a claim to exist. Those requirements are found in Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-9, which provides, 
[F ]or the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claiming 
a title founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases: 
8
 Section 78-12-8 of the Utah Code Ann. states, 
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, 
entered into possession of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other 
right, founding such claim upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of 
the property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, 
and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the property 
included in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some part of the 
property under such claim, for seven years, the property so included is deemed 
to have been held adversely, except that when the property so included consists 
of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot is not deemed a possession 
of any other lot of the same tract. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 (1996). 
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(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. 
(3) Where, although not enclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel, or of 
fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for the 
ordinary use of the occupant. 
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the portion of 
such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not enclosed according 
to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county is deemed to have been 
occupied for the same length of time as the part improved and cultivated. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-9 (2001). In addition to these requirements, Metro West 
must also meet the basic requirements of an adverse possession claim. Those basic 
requirements have been codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-12: 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the 
provisions of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the 
land has been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years 
continuously, and that the party, his predecessors and grantors have 
paid all taxes which have been levied and assessment upon such land 
according to law. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-12(1996)(emphasis added). Additionally, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that in order for an adverse possession claim to prevail, the land 
possession must be open, notorious, and hostile. Mansfield v. Neff, 134 P. 1160,1165 
(Utah 1913). 
Applying these requirements to the case at bar, Metro West's adverse 
possession claim fails. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-9, Metro West must meet the 
mandates of at least one of four sections.. Section (1) requires that the claimant show 
that he has usually cultivated or improved the entire property. Metro West claims to 
have usually improved the property by having bulldozed several roads to allow its soil 
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sample machinery access to parts of the property. (R. 108-13,116-18,121-126). The 
County's memorandum in opposition to Metro West's motion for summary judgment 
directly disputed the sufficiency of the alleged improvements. (R. 186-188). The 
roads do not provide access to all areas of the property. As such, the roads are at most 
arguably an easement through the property, but an easement can only be claimed by 
prescription after 20 years of use. Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61, 68 (Ut. App. 
1999); Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 626 (Ut. App. 1993), cert denied, Homer v. 
Sandy Hills, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). Metro West makes no claim of use or 
possession for twenty years here. 
The sufficiency of Metro West's alleged soil sample drilling, as 
"improvement" or "cultivation" of the land, is also in dispute. There is no evidence 
to corroborate the frequency of or placement of the soil drillings. Nor did Metro West 
present any evidence to indicate that its soil sample testing and drilling were in 
accordance with the ordinary custom and usage of those in the gravel pit business. Cf, 
Day v. Steele, 184 P.2d 216, 219 (1947) (For land to be "usually improved," 
subsection (1) requires that the changes be of a substantial and permanent nature 
sufficient to apprize all as to ownership and such that it could not be mistaken for use 
of the occasional trespasser). Metro West's limited activity on Parcel G resembles 
more closely the holding of land for speculative possible future use, not a present 
actual use. In Pender v. Jackson, 260 P.2d 542, 543-44 (1953) the Utah Supreme 
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Court held that the holding of the land for speculative future use does not satisfy the 
use requirement of the adverse possession statute. Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Appellant, this court should find that because of the existence 
of numerous questions of material fact, the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
was premature under section 78-12-9 (1). 
Metro West also cannot meet the "enclosure" requirements of section (2). 
There were never fences around the property or other type of enclosure that surrounds 
Parcel G. (R. 227). Metro West merely argues that the only access to such property 
was through their legitimately owned property. (Appellees' Brief at 5). Below, the 
County, in opposition to Metro West's motion for summary judgment, disputed 
Metro West's claim that restricted access in anyway constitutes enclosure. (R. 184-
185). Metro West has never contended here that it otherwise enclosed Parcel G with 
fences, gates or other physical enclosures. As such Metro West's claim under section 
(2) cannot be sustained. 
Under section (3) Metro West did not show that the property was being used 
in the ordinary use of the occupant. The other types of use available under this 
section are not applicable because Metro West does not use the property for supply 
of fuel, fencing timber, husbandry, or pasturage. The ordinary use of the occupant has 
been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as, "appropriate to location and character of 
property." Day v. Steele, supra, 184 P.2d at 219 (Utah 1947). 
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Metro West has not shown a specific time frame during which it excavated the 
property owned by Salt Lake County. Neither Metro West principals Paul Richards 
nor Roy McNeil were able to pinpoint a date after the April 1992 aerial photo when 
they entered the land. Their deposition testimony clearly contradicts their contentions 
of open, notorious, continuous possession for seven years. Richards testified that in 
1989, they possibly drilled three to five test holes, this process would take 
approximately one day for each hole. There were no permanent marks left from the 
holes. (R. 224-225). When asked to review the aerial photo taken in April of 1992, 
Richards could identify no permanent observable excavations evidencing the Metro 
West's possession of the subject property. (R. 225-226, 237, 238). Metro West has 
no records of days spent on the subject property, and Richards has no recollection of 
how many days the employees were on the subject property. (R. 226). Other than test 
holes and possible roads, no other uses were made of the property before actual 
mining. (R. 228). Richards does not know when he first started mining the subject 
property. (R. 229). He does not even know where the boundary line on the subject 
property is located. (R. 229, 231, 234). In fact, Richards testified that he is not 
claiming title to the subject property by adverse possession. (R. 230,231). He could 
not say with any specificity what time period he occupied the subject property. (R. 
232-233). 
Similarly, McNeil testified that the Metro West began exploring the soil on 
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the subject property in 1998. (R. 243). He further testified that he did not dig any test 
holes on the subject property. (R. 244). McNeil testified that he did not know when 
the operations began on the subject property, but in 1990 to 1991 operations were on 
the opposite (south) side of the gravel pit, not on Parcel G. Id. McNeil also testified 
he does not know the location of the property line to the subject property. Id. He 
testified he did not know whether any exploration on the subject property occurred 
between 1990 and 1995. He stated that if some exploration had occurred on the Salt 
Lake County property during that period, he doesn't know if any test holes were done 
before 1998. (R. 244-245). Heagreedthatifanytestholes were dug on the subject 
property before that, they each would have taken one day or less each. (R. 245). 
McNeil testified that he didn't know if any roads were ever built on the subject 
property by Appellees, and he could not say with any certainty when or how many 
holes were dug on the subject property by the Appellees. 
Metro West has no claim under section (4), inasmuch as Parcel G is neither a 
known farm or part of a single lot. 
Appellees' Brief cited to Cooper v. Carter Oil Co., 316 P.2d 320 (Utah 1957) 
in support of the argument that the Metro West has met the requirements of adverse 
possession. In Cooper however, it was undisputed that the person that successfully 
adversely possessed the property, grazed sheep for three weeks a year during the 
statutory period he had also enclosed a portion of the property with a fence and had 
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repaired and maintained the fence during that same seven year period. Metro West can 
show no such efforts here. It has not enclosed the property and can't show that Parcel 
G was used for at least three weeks a year during the seven years. 
(B) Metro West Has Not Produced Sufficient Record 
Evidence of Payment of Taxes on Parcel G as 
Required for Adverse Possession 
Metro West also did not met its burden of establishing by clear and undisputed 
record evidence that it paid the requisite taxes on the property during the statutory 
period as mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-12. Absent such record evidence, 
Metro West cannot prevail as a matter of law in its adverse possession, regardless of 
whether it has satisfied the other elements of an adverse possession claim. 
Metro West attempted to establish payment of such taxes by submitting to the 
trial court tax receipts issued by the Utah County Treasurer [R. 66 -75] which, on 
their face, do not even contain a consistent or complete property description for Parcel 
G until tax year 1997, or one year before the Appellee's received actual notice that 
they were wrongfully attempting to occupy the County's land9. In other words, it 
9 
For instance, the receipts for 1990, 1991, and 1992 [R. 66, 67, 68] refer under 
"property description" to a parcel containing "6.30 acres," while the 1993 receipt 
[R. 69] refers to two parcels (one of 21.30 acres, the other of 32.42 acres), 
apparently different parcels than those reflected in the previous receipt. Further 
there is no reference at all to Parcel G in the "property description" portions of 
these tax receipts until the 1997 receipt [R. 73]. The "property description" 
contained in the receipts changes almost from year to year, and appears to contain 
only esoteric property identification codes used by the Utah County treasurer, not a 
customary legal description through which Parcel G could be clearly identified as 
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cannot be determined from the face of these tax receipts whether they in fact apply to 
Parcel G, or to some other parcel(s) possibly located in the same vicinity which Metro 
West used in its sand and gravel operations. Thus, it would be plain error to sustain 
Metro West's adverse possession claim since their purported proof of tax payments 
are facially inadequate to establish payment of taxes with respect to this parcel. 
Therefore, Metro West has failed to meet its burden of establishing-through credible 
and undisputed evidence - its payment of taxes. 
The County preserved its objection in the record to the sufficiency of Metro 
West's payment of taxes when, in the record of oral argument before Judge Peuler, 
counsel for the County argued: 
"... as I understand the record in this case, counsel is 
talking about this property known as Parcel G, but I'm 
the subject of these tax receipts. Moreover, in the receipts for 1990, 1991, 1992, 
1997, 1998 and 1999, the "property description" section ends with a trailing 
notation such as "legal continues," or "more legal," apparently indicating that there 
was additional legal description not included on the face of those receipts. 
Finally, Metro West failed to produce any extrinsic evidence (such as an expert's 
affidavit) interpreting the Utah County treasurer's cryptic codes in the tax receipt 
"property description" section, or otherwise positively linking the tax receipts to 
Parcel G. Consequently, it cannot be determined from the face of these receipts 
whether the taxes paid were actually paid on Parcel G. These purported tax 
receipts are, at best, incomplete because they do not contain a clear identification 
of Parcel G as the property upon which the payment were made. Thus, they are 
facially insufficient as evidence of tax payment for adverse possession purposes. 
These inadequacies in the property descriptions contained in the tax receipts raise 
triable issues of material fact as to whether Metro West actually paid taxes on 
Parcel G, or whether the tax receipts actually pertain to other parcel(s) unrelated to 
this action. 
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not aware - if I misspeak, correct me counsel - of a 
survey provided by [Metro West] in this case saying, 
"This is the land we claim under the Tingey quit-claim 
deed, and this is how it borders Utah County and how it 
borders Salt lake County, and this is our fence around it, 
and this is the area that we have used and cultivated and 
paid taxes on" 
Trans. Oral Argument, January 2,2001, p. 22,1.8-16 [R. 309](emphasis added). The 
County further argued: 
"...by way of example, if they're mining this property and 
it becomes part of their corporate assets and they sell it 
and make a profit, they pay taxes and they pay taxes on 
this mining, but as to other property taxes, I'rn not sure 
the record is clear on this point." 
7d.,p.45,1.15-19 [R. 309](emphasis added). Counsel for Metro West then responded 
to the County's argument regarding lack of clarity in the record in identifying Parcel 
G as the subject of the tax payments (id, p. 47,1. 10-19 [R. 309]). Hence, this issue 
was properly raised and preserved by the County, addressed by Metro West, and 
considered by the trial court. 
(C) There is a Genuine Issue of Fact as to Whether 
the County "Designated [Parcel G] for a Public 
Use," Thereby Barring any Claim by Adverse 
Possession under Sec. 78-12-13 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-1-13 bars any claim by adverse possession 
to property held by a governmental entity which has been "designated for public 
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use."10 Metro West acknowledges (Appellees' Brief at 27-29) that the deposition 
testimony of Roger Hillam of the County's real estate division establishes that the 
County discussed "tentatively" in 1998 building a public park and bridge that would 
cross the Jordan River and run across Parcel G to connect to the Bonneville Shoreline 
Trail [R. 288-291]. The County has found no Utah cases requiring anything more 
than such "tentative" plans to qualify as a "designation for a public use" under Sec. 
78-12-13. The discussions referenced in the record by Mr. Hillam, however 
"tentative" or "preliminary," clearly evince an intent by the County to apply Parcel G 
to public use. 
As the Washington Court of Appeals held in City of Benton v. Adrian, et. aL, 
50 Wash. App., 330 (1988), "... title by adverse possession, or an easement by 
prescription, cannot be acquired to property held by a municipal corporation for 
10 
The statute, in its entirety, provides as follows: 
"No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands 
held by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated for 
public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or for any 
other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof tor any length of time 
whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or county or 
the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of, and conveyed 
such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and that for more than 
seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or 
successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous and adverse 
possession of such real estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired." 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-13 (Emphasis added). 
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public purposes in its governmental capacity." Id., at 336. Similarly, this court has 
held that "... property held by municipalities ... cannot be acquired by adverse 
possession, at least insofar as the property is held for public use." Averett v. Utah Co. 
Drainage Dist., 763 P.2d 428, 429-30 (Ut. App.1988). In Averett, this court cited 
Commercial Waterway Dist. V. Permanente Cement Co, 61 Wash. 2d 509, 379 P.2d 
178, 181(1963) for the proposition that a "waterway held in trust for public use was 
not subject to adverse possession despite the fact that the subject property was not 
being used as a regular waterway, was outside a presently dredged channel, and there 
was no foreseeable plan to use it." Averett, at 430 (emphasis added). Thus, this 
court has protected government ownership of property against adverse possession 
claims even in the absence of a "foreseeable plan" to put the property to a public use. 
It is sound and sensible public policy to require only minimal evidence showing a 
"designation" or "holding" of property for a public use by a governmental entity as 
against an adverse possession claimant because the law supports government's vital 
role as a holder of property in trust for the benefit of the public. Stated otherwise, it 
should not be an easy task for a private party to "wrest away" from government 
property which is held in trust for the public good. 
Should this court not find that the undisputed testimony of Mr. Hillam is 
sufficient as a matter of law to establish "designation for a public use" under Sec. 78-
12-13, at the very least, the record gives rise to a triable issue of fact as to whether 
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Parcel G had been "designated for public use." If it had been, then Metro West's 
claim by adverse possession is barred at the threshold. 
For this additional reason, the trial court's ruling should not be affirmed based 
on Metro West's claim of adverse possession. As with other matters previously 
discussed, this claim is one filled with unresolved factual issues which should be 
remanded for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this court should hold as matter of law that Metro 
West was not a "good faith" purchaser of Parcel G for purposes of the Utah recording 
act because it took its purported title from the Tingeys with notice of infirmity in such 
title, and remand for trial solely on the numerous fact issues underlying Metro West's 
adverse possession claim. 
In the alternative, this court should remand for trial both on the adverse 
possession claim, and on factual issues surrounding Metro West's status as good faith 
subsequent purchaser under the recording act. 
DATED this 31st day of January, 2002. 
David E. Yocom 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
By: 
Donpansen 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant Salt Lake County 
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